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REDUCING CAUSAL AMBIGUITY IN ACQUISITION
INTEGRATION: INTERMEDIATE GOALS AS MEDIATORS OF
INTEGRATION DECISIONS AND
ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE
MARGARET CORDING
Rice University
PETRA CHRISTMANN
Rutgers University
DAVID R. KING
U.S. Air Force
Integration is a difficult process, but one that is vital to acquisition performance. One
reason acquirers encounter difficulties is that the integration process exhibits high
levels of intrafirm linkage ambiguity—a lack of clarity in the causal link between
integration decisions and their performance outcomes. We introduce the construct of
intermediate goals as a mechanism that reduces intrafirm linkage ambiguity. Our
structural model results, based on a sample of 129 horizontal acquisitions, indicate
that the achievement of two intermediate goals (internal reorganization and market
expansion) fully mediates the relationships between four integration decisions and
acquisition performance.

arate firms (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Pablo,
1994) and has been found to be a key determinant
of acquisition performance (Larsson & Lubatkin,
2001). The integration literature has been criticized
for inadequate theoretical frameworks linking explanatory variables to acquisition performance
(Datta & Grant, 1990; Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, & Best,
1998; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Moesel, 1993),
raising concerns that extant models of acquisition
performance might be underspecified. King et al.’s
(2004) meta-analysis of acquisition performance
studies supported this view with their finding that
unidentified mediators were driving variance in
acquisition performance. In this article, we build
on insights from the resource-based view (Barney,
1986, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984) to focus on a previously unexplored area: the causal
ambiguity between integration decisions and performance outcomes in acquisitions, and mechanisms that may reduce this causal ambiguity.
Causal ambiguity refers to a lack of understanding
about the link between resources or decisions and
performance outcomes (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982);
such a lack of understanding, we argue, makes integration difficult.
Much of the empirical literature on the resourcebased view explores the relationships among a
firm’s stock of resources, the characteristics of
those resources, and resulting firm performance

The assumption of most research is that the goal
of an acquisition is higher financial performance
(e.g., Barney, 1988; Datta, 1991; Lubatkin, 1987;
Zollo & Singh, 2004), but meta-analyses have
shown that on average acquisitions fail to create
value for acquiring firm shareholders (Datta,
Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily, &
Covin, 2004). Some researchers have explored how
characteristics of the target selection and negotiation processes can lead to overpayment for a target
by an acquirer, dooming the transaction from the
very start (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Morck,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990; Sirower, 1997). Other researchers, especially those in the strategy field,
have focused on how issues that arise during the
integration of acquisitions contribute to poor acquisition performance. Integration refers to the managerial actions taken to combine two previously sep-
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(e.g., Farjoun, 1998; Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, &
Kochhar, 2001; Huselid, Jackson, & Schuler, 1997;
Zollo & Singh, 2004). The authors of these studies
have generally assumed that the possession of resources with certain characteristics is sufficient for
the creation of sustainable competitive advantage
(Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). However, for generating competitive advantage, a firm’s exploitation
of existing resources during strategy implementation is arguably as important as changing the stock
of resources it owns (Barney & Arikan, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2007). Although an acquisition represents one case in which a firm significantly alters
its stock of resources, the challenge of integration is
to implement the strategy behind the acquisition by
reconfiguring, realigning, and rationalizing not
only the target’s resources, but also the interactions
between the acquirer’s and target’s resources (Capron, 1999; Karim, 2006; Karim & Mitchell, 2000).
The construct of intrafirm causal ambiguity from
the resource-based view emerges as a key issue in
strategy implementation. Intrafirm linkage ambiguity, one type of casual ambiguity, is a lack of understanding of the causal link or path between an
action and its performance outcome within a focal
firm (King & Zeithaml, 2001). It can hinder successful strategy implementation because intrafirm linkage ambiguity limits managers’ ability to accurately
predict the outcome of specific implementation decisions, leading to suboptimal decisions and ultimately harming performance (King & Zeithaml,
2001).
Despite the construct’s importance, research on
reducing intrafirm linkage ambiguity is limited,
possibly because it is, by definition, difficult to
observe. Coff (1997) recommended that researchers
identify organizational settings in which causal
ambiguity is more likely to occur. We suggest that
acquisition integration is one such setting and that
the identification of intermediate goals is one
mechanism that can reduce intrafirm linkage ambiguity. Intermediate goals are organizational milestones that must be attained on the path to higher
acquisition performance. Integration decisions affect the achievement of intermediate goals more
directly and immediately than they affect acquisition performance, so integration decisions are sequentially closer to intermediate goals than some
measure of acquisition performance. Identifying intermediate goals helps reduce intrafirm linkage ambiguity because the complex causal chain is broken
down into manageable segments. Managing with a
view to the achievement of intermediate goals
rather than (or in addition to) ultimate acquisition performance is likely to contribute to a more
refined understanding of the relationship be-
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tween decisions and outcomes. We develop and
test a structural model in which intermediate
goal achievement serves as a mediating variable
linking integration decisions and acquisition
performance.
Our study differs from other studies on causal
ambiguity in two respects. First, most prior empirical studies have focused on characteristic ambiguity—that is, on ambiguity that is inherent to resources themselves and depends on resource
attributes such as tacitness, complexity, and specificity (Reed & DeFillipi, 1990); instead, our study
focuses on linkage ambiguity, or ambiguity about
the causal link between an action and its outcomes
(King & Zeithaml, 2001). Second, in the existing
literature estimation of the effects of causal ambiguity on performance or other outcomes is prevalent; instead, our intent was to find a mechanism
that reduces intrafirm linkage ambiguity. Rather
than quantifying the extent of intrafirm linkage ambiguity present during integration, we examined
whether intermediate goals reduced intrafirm linkage ambiguity. If intermediate goal achievement
mediated the effects of integration decisions on
acquisition performance, we could conclude that
intrafirm linkage ambiguity was reduced, because
this mediation would indicate the generative mechanism through which integration decisions impact
acquisition performance. Understanding of cause
and effect would thereby be enhanced.
Our model is limited to horizontal acquisitions,
or transactions in which target and acquirer operate
in the same industry. Horizontal acquisitions are
efforts to seek economies of scale from greater efficiency, economies of scope from leveraging shared
resources, and/or revenue increases from market
expansion (Bower, 2001). We focused on horizontal
acquisitions because they often have two related
intermediate goals: internal reorganization and
market expansion.
Our study makes several contributions to the resource-based view and acquisition literatures.
First, we extend recent conceptual resource-based
work on how causal ambiguity is related to firm
performance by identifying a mechanism that reduces intrafirm linkage ambiguity. Second, we apply the resource-based view to issues that arise
during strategy implementation, an area that has
received scant attention in the empirical literature
representing this theory. Third, we provide an important clarification of the generative mechanisms
through which integration decisions impact acquisition performance by exploring the mediating role
of intermediate goal achievement in acquisition
integration.
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THEORY DEVELOPMENT
The concept of causal ambiguity was first articulated by Lippman and Rumelt as “ambiguity as to
what factors are responsible for superior (or inferior) performance” (1982: 420) or “ambiguity
surrounding the linkage between action and performance” (1982: 421). Thus, causal ambiguity
describes uncertainty among employees, managers, and competitors regarding the factors that
contribute to firm performance (Barney, 1991;
Coff, 1997; Peteraf, 1993). Although early work
on this concept focused on interfirm causal ambiguity as a barrier to imitation by competitors
that helps to protect a firm’s source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool,
1989; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Peteraf, 1993;
Reed & DeFillippi, 1990), the concept of causal
ambiguity has recently been extended to the intrafirm transfer or leveraging of “best practices”
(King & Zeithaml, 2001). Intrafirm causal ambiguity exists when managers do not understand
how their resources or decisions affect their own
firm’s performance (King, 2007; King & Zeithaml,
2001). Interfirm and intrafirm causal ambiguity
can be further segmented into characteristic and
linkage ambiguity (King & Zeithaml, 2001).
High levels of intrafirm ambiguity create several
problems. Intrafirm ambiguity makes it difficult for
managers to assess the implications of their decisions and make adjustments (McEvily, Das, & McCabe, 2000; Reed & DeFillippi, 1990; Winter & Szulanski, 2001); impedes the creation of knowledge
(McEvily et al., 2000) and the transfer of best practices within a firm (Szulanski, 1996); prevents the
firm from learning (Huber, 1991; March & Olsen,
1975); limits the firm’s effective response to environmental change (Collis, 1994; King, 2007); and
creates opportunities for “moral hazard” by individual managers, who are able to claim responsibility for successes and avoid responsibility for failures (Coff, 1997). Overall, high levels of intrafirm
ambiguity contribute to poor decision quality, especially in dynamic environments (King, 2007).
Empirical work on intrafirm ambiguity has primarily addressed the question of how it affects
organizational outcomes such as knowledge transfer or performance. Several studies have examined
the effects of intrafirm characteristic ambiguity on
the internal transfer of knowledge. They have
shown that knowledge transfer is facilitated by the
ease of codifying and communicating a capability
(Zander & Kogut, 1995), the absence of knowledge
tacitness (Simonin, 1999; Szulanski, 1996), and the
absence of knowledge complexity (Simonin, 1999).
To the best of our knowledge, the only study that
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has explicitly examined the effect of intrafirm linkage ambiguity on firm performance is a work by
King and Zeithaml (2001). They found that high
levels of intrafirm linkage ambiguity have negative
effects on firm performance and that high levels of
intrafirm characteristic ambiguity generally have
positive effects on firm performance. They concluded that although high intrafirm characteristic
ambiguity is desirable to prevent duplication by
competitors, high levels of intrafirm linkage ambiguity hinder managers’ ability to recognize, appropriate, and transfer resources to improve firm
performance.
The Presence of Intrafirm Linkage Ambiguity
during Integration
Integration is an organizational transformation
(Anand & Singh, 1997) characterized by high levels
of intrafirm linkage ambiguity.1 This ambiguity
stems from the complexity and interdependence of
integration decisions and from the time delay between these decisions and their visible effects on
performance. First, numerous organizational units
are in a state of flux during integration, each attempting to resolve uncertainty and create a sense
of order. At the same time, each unit is also interacting with other subunits experiencing similar
change and uncertainty. The resulting confusion
and lack of clarity hinder a newly combined firm’s
ability to isolate the performance effects of specific
integration decisions. Indeed, Zollo and Singh argued that the large number of interdependent and
simultaneous decisions required make it “hard for
acquirers to assess the performance outcomes of the
integration process” (2004: 1240). This view is consistent with that held by researchers in strategic
decision making and strategy implementation, who
have long recognized that a strategic decision (e.g.,
to make an acquisition) creates “waves” of interrelated subdecisions (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Théorêt, 1976) (e.g., about how deeply to integrate target
into acquirer), all of which must be performed effectively for the strategic decision to be successful (Dean
& Sharfman, 1996).
Second, there is high temporal distance (King,
1
Acquisitions represent one setting in which interfirm
and intrafirm causal ambiguity coexist (King, 2007). Interfirm causal ambiguity is present during the due diligence and negotiation phase of acquisition, during which
time the acquirer seeks to reduce ambiguity by gaining
access to detailed information so that the target may be
valued appropriately (Pablo, 1994). This interfirm causal
ambiguity shifts to intrafirm causal ambiguity once the
acquisition is completed and integration begins.
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2007) between integration decisions and performance outcomes. Several researchers have suggested three years as a sufficient amount of time for
changes to be observed in acquisition performance (Ingham, Kran, & Lovestam, 1992; Lubatkin,
Schulze, Mainkar, & Cotterill, 2001). Shorter time
frames, even two years, may not provide enough
time to capture how acquisitions contribute to an
acquiring firm’s performance (Saxton & Dollinger,
2004). Since managers’ understanding of causal relationships deteriorates over time (Walsh & Ungson, 1991), this temporal distance makes it difficult
to assess the performance implications of their decisions (King, 2007).
Thus, acquisition integration represents one setting in which intrafirm linkage ambiguity is high.
This intrafirm linkage ambiguity creates problems
during the integration process (Jemison & Sitkin,
1986). Because integration plays a key role in an
acquirer’s ability to capture value from an acquisition (Capron & Pistre, 2002; Larsson & Lubatkin,
2001), it is fruitful to consider ways in which firms
may reduce this ambiguity.
Reducing Intrafirm Linkage Ambiguity during
Integration: The Role of Intermediate Goals
Some authors have argued that causal ambiguity
is inherently irreducible and that even a firm possessing an advantage must be uncertain about its
source to prevent diffusion to competitors (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). However, this point of view
is contrary to the observation that organizations
differ in the extent to which they reduce causal
ambiguity by codifying information (Kogut &
Zander, 1992; Winter, 1987). Zollo and Winter
(2002) suggested that firms can reduce causal ambiguity through explicit articulation and codification mechanisms. Mosakowski (1997) argued that
reducibility of causal ambiguity is a function, in
part, of a firm’s ability to know the causal structure
of action and outcome.
We suggest that attention to the chain of events
through which integration decisions affect acquisition performance can help reduce intrafirm
linkage ambiguity associated with the complexity
and temporal distance of the integration process.
A better understanding of the sequence of events
that links each integration decision to changes in
acquisition performance reduces intrafirm linkage ambiguity because managers are better able to
associate an action with its related outcome
(King, 2007). The identification of mediating
variables, such as achieved intermediate goals,
that are outcomes of decisions and antecedents to
ultimate performance outcomes should thus re-
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duce intrafirm linkage ambiguity. Because integration decisions are sequentially closer to mediating variables than they are to the performance
outcomes, the complexity and temporal distance
associated with integration decisions and acquisition performance are reduced.
Therefore, acquirers can reduce the negative
effects associated with high intrafirm linkage ambiguity by taking an incremental (Quinn, 1980) or
“baby step” (Mosakowski, 1997) approach to
strategy implementation. Parceling the complex
causal chain into more manageable chunks refines firms’ causal understanding, improves the
quality of decision making, and enhances performance (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt,
1989; Skivington & Daft, 1991). An incremental
approach that employs intermediate goals is consistent with Grant’s (2003) idea of “planned
emergence” that includes both hierarchical structure (to impose order and structure) and operational flexibility (permitting managers to respond
to changing circumstances). By holding managers
accountable for achieving intermediate goals, top
management focuses business unit managers’ attention on these key issues (Langley, 1989), thus
aligning the operating decisions of these managers with their firm’s strategic objectives. In addition, the use of intermediate goals as incremental
steps enables the firm to evaluate these managers
without the noise of other initiatives and actions
that impact financial performance but are outside
the control of a business unit (Levinthal & March,
1993). Grant (2003) found that intermediate goals
are effective in guiding organizations in the desired strategic direction. Moreover, Dean and
Sharfman (1996) argued that orienting strategic
decisions toward organizational goals facilitates
effective implementation of those decisions.
An understanding of the causal chain that links
integration decisions, intermediate goals, and acquisition performance reduces intrafirm linkage
ambiguity. Gaining such understanding alone,
however, is not sufficient to achieve higher acquisition performance. If reduction in intrafirm linkage ambiguity is to result in improved acquisition
performance, firms must not only understand the
role of intermediate goals but must also achieve
them. The achievement of the intermediate goals
makes the reduction in intrafirm linkage ambiguity
valuable by facilitating higher acquisition performance. Thus, both an understanding of the causal
structure and achievement of the intermediate
goals are necessary for a valuable reduction in intrafirm linkage ambiguity to occur.
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Overview of the Model
Figure 1 presents an overview of our model. Our
model suggests that different integration decisions
contribute to the achievement of different intermediate goals, which in turn contribute to acquisition
performance. By identifying variables that serve
as intermediate goals in the acquisition integration process and by empirically examining how
achievement of these intermediate goals links integration decisions to acquisition performance, our
model contributes to an understanding of the complex causal chain leading to acquisition performance and thus to a reduction in intrafirm linkage
ambiguity in the acquisition integration process.
With Hypotheses 1 through 4, we posit relationships between integration decisions and intermediate goal achievement, and with Hypotheses 5 and 6,
we posit a causal path between intermediate goal
achievement and acquisition performance.
Our study includes two intermediate goals that
are commonly employed in horizontal acquisitions. First, the goal of internally reorganizing combined firms’ operations is realized by consolidating
operations (e.g., asset rationalization and elimination of redundancies) and encouraging coordinated exchange of knowledge and information
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Second, the goal of
market expansion is realized by leveraging coordinated market activities to increase the acquirer’s
market share, products offered, geographic markets
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served, customer markets served and/or effective
selling of one firm’s products to the other’s customers (Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Vermeulen &
Barkema, 2001). Achievement of these intermediate goals should lead to the economies of scale and
scope and increased revenues that are necessary for
higher acquisition performance.
Our two intermediate goals can be illustrated by
Procter & Gamble’s (P&G’s) 2005 acquisition of Gillette Company. P&G expected cost savings from
combining operations in purchasing, manufacturing, logistics, marketing, and administrative overlap and looked for enhanced revenues from distributing Gillette brands into channels and markets
where P&G had a presence but Gillette did not, as
well as from leveraging Gillette’s channels where
P&G brands were not fully developed (Procter &
Gamble, 2005 ). To realize these expected cost savings and revenue increases and in turn generate
higher acquisition performance, P&G needed to
achieve the intermediate goals of internal reorganization and market expansion.
Not all horizontal acquisitions have identical
intermediate goals. Other goals (such as the acquisition of specific knowledge or technologies, diversification of financial risk, or acquiring a target
before a competitor does) may be sought, but research has suggested that internal reorganization
and market expansion are the most commonly pursued goals in horizontal acquisitions (Bower,

FIGURE 1
Theoretical Model of Integration Decisions, Weighted Intermediate
Goal Achievement, and Acquisition Performance
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2001). Acquirers may also differ with respect to the
relative importance of these two intermediate
goals. Some horizontal acquisitions may be pursued primarily for consolidation purposes; the economic logic of others is more heavily dependent on
market expansion. Clearly, the achievement of an
unimportant goal should not have the same effects
on acquisition performance as the achievement of
an important goal. Therefore, in our model we consider the importance of each intermediate goal to
an acquirer by weighting intermediate goal
achievement by goal importance.
The selection of integration decisions included
in our model is consistent with a resource-based
view of integration as a process of transferring,
deleting, and retaining resources (Capron, Mitchell,
& Swaminathan, 2001; Karim & Mitchell, 2000).
Each of the four decisions in our model affects
different aspects of a firm’s resources. Our first
integration decision, integration depth, is related to
internal resource reconfiguration. Integration depth
is a basic strategic choice regarding the degree of
structural and resource reconfiguration of an acquiring and acquired firm (Datta & Grant, 1990;
Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Puranam et al., 2006).
Our second integration decision, integration speed,
concerns the length of time the resources of the two
organizations are disrupted during integration
(Schweiger, Ivancevich, & Power, 1987). Our third
integration decision, top management team (TMT)
turnover, is an oft-cited acquisition integration issue (e.g., Walsh, 1988) because managers represent
potentially valuable resources in the combined
firm that may be lost during integration (Bergh,
2001; Cannella & Hambrick, 1993). Our fourth integration decision, market focus, addresses the fact
that the focus on internal resource reconfiguration
during the acquisition integration process may
compromise the amount of attention and resources
the acquirer devotes to its external environment.
These four integration decisions have been examined in existing studies of acquisition performance
but have been related directly to acquisition performance rather than to intermediate goal achievement.
Although we base our hypothesis development on
this acquisition literature, we suggest in Hypotheses 1 though 4 that the integration decisions are
sequentially closer to intermediate goal achievement than to acquisition performance.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Having discussed the theoretical arguments for
the mediating role of intermediate goal achievement, we turn to developing hypotheses about
the associations between integration decisions
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and intermediate goal achievement, and between
intermediate goal achievement and acquisition
performance.

Integration Decisions Related to Internal
Reorganization Goal Achievement
The following discussion develops hypotheses
relating two integration decisions—integration
depth and integration speed—to internal reorganization goal achievement.
Integration depth. Depth of integration reflects
the degree of change in structural relationships between a target and an acquirer (Datta & Grant, 1990;
Karim, 2006). Integration depth ranges from minimal to complete (Pablo, 1994), and its primary objective is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the combined resources of the target and
acquirer (Datta, 1991). Minimal integration depth
might involve combining such functions as accounting systems while leaving the target largely
intact (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). A higher level
of integration depth is achieved when certain functional areas, such as production and/or marketing
departments, are combined to extract economies of
scale or scope from the acquisition. The greatest
depth of integration occurs when all structural and
cultural boundaries between target and acquirer are
dissolved (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).
Although recent research has shown a direct relationship between integration depth and acquisition performance (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999;
Zollo & Singh, 2004), the arguments supporting
such findings apply more closely to internal reorganization goal achievement. For instance, Zollo
and Singh (2004) noted that deeply integrating a
target requires a large number of interdependent
actions that make it difficult to determine a direct
link between a decision concerning integration
depth and performance outcomes. Researchers
have argued that depth of integration unlocks the
advantages of combining operations through the
realization of economies of scale, coordination, and
knowledge transfer (Datta & Grant, 1990; Puranam
et al., 2006), suggesting that integrating firm structures and processes is more closely linked to the
achievement of internal reorganization goals. Thus,
integration depth can be expected to be sequentially closer to the achievement of the intermediate
goal of internal reorganization than to acquisition
performance. Therefore:
Hypothesis 1. The greater the integration
depth, the greater the internal reorganization
goal achievement.
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Integration speed. Speed has often been identified as an important consideration in acquisition
research (e.g., Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Some
researchers have argued that a fast integration is
advantageous because it minimizes disruption to
employees (e.g., Cannella & Hambrick, 1993), reduces the time during which competitors may
profit from an acquirer being distracted by integration issues (Homburg & Bucerius, 2005), and improves acquisition performance by accelerating
value creation (Larsson, Brousseau, Driver, &
Sweet, 2004; Sirower, 1997).2 Homburg and Bucerius (2005, 2006) found a positive and significant
relationship between speed of integration and performance in the first of their two empirical studies
of this relationship and found a contingent relationship in the second study. When an acquirer and
a target share similar internal characteristics (as is
often the case in horizontal acquisitions), a stronger, positive relationship between speed and performance was found than when these internal qualities were more dissimilar (Homburg & Bucerius,
2006).
We argue that integration speed affects acquisition performance because it facilitates internal reorganization goal achievement. Achieving the goal of
internal reorganization requires (among other
things) that an acquirer create a new organization
that encourages the coordinated exchange of
knowledge and information. Uncertainty among
employees about the ways activities will be
changed and the extent of required adaptation and
adjustment (Karim, 2006) leads to well-documented employee resistance (Buono & Bowditch,
1989; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). Employee resistance involves behaviors such as distrust, hostility,
and self-preservation, and an “us versus them” antagonism, which all inhibit the acquirer’s ability to
gain the cooperation and knowledge exchange required for internal reorganization goal achievement. The impact of these behaviors on the
achievement of internal reorganization goals can be
minimized by shortening the length of the change
process (Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Kim & Mauborgne,
1998). Thus, integration speed can be expected to
be sequentially closer to internal reorganization
goal achievement than to acquisition performance.
Therefore:

2

According to an alternate perspective, integrating a
target firm too fast may destroy valuable tacit and embedded resources and capabilities that were sought from
an acquisition (Graebner, 2004; Ranft & Lord, 2002).
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Hypothesis 2. The faster the integration, the
greater the internal reorganization goal
achievement.
Integration Decisions Related to Market
Expansion Goal Achievement
The following discussion develops hypotheses
that relate TMT turnover and market focus to
achieving market expansion goals.
TMT turnover. Top management team turnover
is common following an acquisition (Walsh, 1988).
Although research on corporate control has focused
on replacing ineffective target firm management
(Walsh & Ellwood, 1991), recent research predominately frames TMT turnover as harming acquisition performance (e.g., Bower, 2001; Krishnan,
Miller, & Judge, 1997; Zollo & Singh, 2004). TMT
turnover has detrimental effects because valuable
human and social resources are lost (Zollo & Singh,
2004), and lower acquisition performance has been
observed with high turnover of either target or acquiring firm managers (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993;
Krishnan et al., 1997; Zollo & Singh, 2004). This is
particularly true for turnover that occurs after an
initial postacquisition TMT is in place, since ineffective managers will most likely have been replaced prior to a combined firm’s establishing its
initial postacquisition management team.
Market expansion goals extend an acquirer’s
market reach into related markets and product
lines. Because knowledge is market- and productspecific (Patel & Pavitt, 1997), with executives developing expertise for particular product-markets
(Harris & Helfat, 1997), successfully moving into
new geographic or product segments depends on a
combined firm’s retention of executives from the
target and acquiring firms to understand how to
integrate and leverage the combined firm’s resources into new market opportunities. Thus,
achieving market expansion goals likely requires
retaining TMT tacit knowledge. TMT turnover can
be expected to be sequentially closer to market
expansion goal achievement than to acquisition
performance. Therefore:
Hypothesis 3. The lower the turnover in an
initial postacquisition TMT, the greater the
market expansion goal achievement.
Market focus. Customers are particularly salient
stakeholders for a firm’s performance (Schuler &
Cording, 2006) and represent valuable resources for
the firm. Nonetheless, many acquirers are internally focused during integration and neglect market-related issues (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland,
1990). There is some evidence in the marketing
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literature that neglecting the external market negatively impacts acquisition performance. For example, Morrall (1996) found that retaining customers
is more important to acquisition performance than
reducing costs. Urban and Pratt (2000) observed
that customer service quality often declines during
integration. Homburg and Bucerius (2005) concluded that a strong emphasis on creating value for
customers during integration facilitates the building of trust between them and a newly combined
firm, reducing customer uncertainty, dissatisfaction, and defection.
We define market focus as the extent to which
management remains attentive to customer needs
during integration (Homburg & Bucerius, 2005). It
seems intuitive that acquirers that remain committed to serving their customers, seek to improve
customer value, and monitor market-related issues
during integration should be more successful in
growing their market shares and expanding into
new customer or geographic market segments.
Moreover, the benefits reaped from this market focus are visible more quickly and directly in market
expansion intermediate goal metrics (such as the
level of cross-selling by a combined firm’s sales
force, expansion into new market segments, and
increases in market share) than in more distant
measures of firm performance. Thus, market focus can be expected to be sequentially closer to
the achievement of the intermediate goal of market expansion than to acquisition performance.
Therefore:
Hypothesis 4. The greater the market focus
during integration, the greater the market expansion goal achievement.
Relating Internal Reorganization Goal
Achievement to Market Expansion
Goal Achievement
Market expansion goal achievement requires a
newly combined firm to coordinate the resources of
both prior firms to leverage the interdependent resources and marketing activities necessary to meet
customer needs. We argue that internal reorganization goal achievement facilitates the acquirer’s ability to achieve its market expansion goals because
internal reorganization goal achievement lays the
structural foundation needed for exploiting market
expansion opportunities (Barney, 1997; Gulati &
Singh, 1998; Thompson, 1967).
Exploitation of market expansion opportunities
requires astute management of the interdependencies between target and acquirer. This is a difficult
managerial task that has long been studied by or-
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ganizational scholars (Galbraith, 1977; Lawrence &
Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). The management
challenge increases as the complexity of the interdependencies increases (Gulati & Singh, 1998).
Thompson (1967) articulated three categories of interdependencies, the most challenging of which is
reciprocal interdependencies.3 These exist when
two or more organizational units share resources
and the action of one unit impacts the ability of
another to achieve its goals (Thompson, 1967). Reciprocal interdependencies frequently underlie an
acquisition’s market expansion economic logic because market expansion requires the acquirer to
capture the value embedded in the value chains of
the two firms by managing the successful sharing of
resources (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Returning
to our example of P&G’s acquisition of Gillette,
successful market expansion involved the management of a significant number of interdependencies
as P&G attempted to distribute Gillette brands into
channels and markets in which P&G had a presence
but Gillette did not, as well as leveraging Gillette’s channels where P&G brands were not fully
developed.
To capture the gains from reciprocal interdependencies, a firm incurs coordination costs to mitigate the uncertainty of complex and interdependent tasks (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Thompson, 1967).
Structural controls such as authority systems, incentive systems, standard operating policies, and
management information systems are the primary
mechanisms used to encourage superior task coordination and reduce uncertainty (Barnard, 1938;
Gulati & Singh, 1998; Thompson, 1967)—the very
issues acquirers are focused on during internal reorganization. Puranam et al. (2006) claimed that because internal reorganization is a formal design
choice, reorganization must occur before other integration objectives can be achieved. Researchers
taking the resource-based view have also recognized the relationship between a firm’s structural
organization and its ability to extract value from its
resources. Indeed, in his “VRIO framework,” Barney (1997) explicitly considered the role of organ3

The other two types of interdependencies are pooled
and sequential. Pooled interdependencies are the simplest and arise when each organizational unit makes a
discrete and independent contribution to its organization
(Thompson, 1967). A conglomerate comprised of unrelated businesses will likely only have pooled interdependencies among its business units. A more complex form
of interdependencies is termed sequential because these
exist when the output of one organizational unit serves as
the input to another (Thompson, 1967). Vertical integration is a classic example of sequential interdependencies.
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ization in building sustainable competitive advantage. He argued that possession of valuable, rare,
and inimitable resources is insufficient for competitive advantage; a firm must also be organized in a
manner that permits exploiting their full potential
(Barney, 1997). Winter’s work on organizational
routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 1995) also
states that an effective organizational infrastructure
(comprised of routines) is the central mechanism
through which resources are coordinated and/or
deployed to create value. Therefore, we expected
the achievement of a firm’s market expansion goals
to benefit from the firm’s first achieving its internal
reorganization goals. Therefore:
Hypothesis 5. The greater the internal reorganization goal achievement, the greater the market expansion goal achievement.
Relating Intermediate Goal Achievement to
Acquisition Performance
We next turn to the relationship between intermediate goal achievement and acquisition performance. We conceptualize acquisition performance as
long-term abnormal stock returns to an acquirer
because we are interested in the effects of integration decisions on performance outcomes. Longterm abnormal stock returns provide an indication
of investors’ revised expectations of future cash
flows. The revision in expectations occurs as information is revealed about the progress of integration
(Lubatkin, 1987).
Abnormal returns represent the deviation of actual stock performance from the performance expectations investors would have had in the absence
of an acquisition, net of the premium paid by an
acquirer. They are thus intended to isolate the performance effects of acquisitions. Abnormal returns
equal 0 if an acquirer paid a premium that equals
the expected gains in cash flow generated by the
acquisition (in net present value terms). In this
case, the premium benefits the shareholders of the
target firm, and the acquiring firm’s shareholders
earn normal returns. Abnormal returns are positive
when cash flows in excess of the acquisition premium (again, in net present value terms) are generated, and the opposite is true for negative abnormal
returns (e.g., Sirower, 1997).
Under what conditions can acquirers expect to
earn abnormal returns? Barney (1988) provided the
theoretical logic for addressing this question. He
argued that an acquirer will earn positive abnormal
returns only when at least one of these three conditions is met: the acquirer and target have valuable
synergistic cash flows that are (1) privately known
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and unique to the target and acquirer, (2) inimitable, and/or (3) unexpected. We focus on the first
two of these conditions. If the source of value from
combining firms is publicly known and available to
multiple potential acquirers, the acquisition premium will rise as multiple bidders compete to acquire the target. This premium will rise to an
amount equal to or greater than the net present
value of those cash flows, leaving the successful
acquirer with normal, or even negative, abnormal
returns (Barney, 1988).4
Using an acquisition solely as a way to generate
cost savings from economies of scale or scope is
likely in industries that are suffering from overcapacity (Anand & Singh, 1997) and in industries in
which the economic logic is to derive cost efficiencies from larger scale (Zollo & Singh, 2004). When
overcapacity exists or economies of scale are large,
similar firms will logically implement horizontal
acquisition strategies with the goal of gaining cost
efficiencies through internal reorganization. In this
situation, because the cash flows from the combined firms are publicly known and not unique to
one acquirer, it is likely that acquisition premiums
will be bid up to equal the expected gains from
such acquisitions (Barney, 1988), leaving the acquirer with normal returns.
However, an acquirer can expect to earn positive
abnormal returns when the value of a target is
known only to the acquirer. In addition, even if
other bidders are aware of the possible cash flows,
the acquirer may still earn abnormal returns if
those bidders cannot duplicate the cash flows because of dissimilar resource profiles. Barney (1988)
argued that these conditions typically hold when
inimitable resources of the acquirer are leveraged
in the transaction (e.g., product or brand reputation, marketing capabilities, and organizational
culture). This high standard for uniquely valuable
and inimitable resource combinations is more
likely to be present from market expansion opportunities than from internal reorganization benefits
(Capron & Pistre, 2002). Consider once again P&G’s
acquisition of Gillette. P&G’s unique market development capabilities enabled it to expand Gillette’s
brands on a global basis and to increase the brand
equity for the combined firm. The ability to leverage P&G’s market presence for Gillette products,
and Gillette’s market presence for P&G’s products,
also presented a fairly unique opportunity. More
generally, resources that help a firm expand its
market are more likely to be unique and inimitable,

4

Other authors have referred to this tendency as the
“winner’s curse” (Varaiya & Ferris, 1987).
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and therefore less likely to be bid away, than resources employed to generate economies of scale.
As we argued above, internal reorganization is often required to support the exploitation of these
unique opportunities. Although internal reorganization must be deftly managed to secure the benefits
from an acquisition, because these benefits do not
meet the tests of inimitability and/or private information, internal reorganization goal achievement can at
best result in normal returns and at worse in negative
abnormal returns (i.e., if the integration process is
poorly executed). Internal reorganization goal achievement can then be viewed as a necessary but not
sufficient condition for positive abnormal returns
from an acquisition. Positive abnormal returns are
expected only under conditions of inimitability
and/or private information (Barney, 1988), conditions that are more likely to exist with market expansion goal achievement. Therefore:
Hypothesis 6. The greater the market expansion goal achievement, the greater the acquisition performance.
METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
Sample. We restricted our study population to
horizontal acquisitions, defined as those in which
target and acquirer have at least one four-digit Standard Industrial Classification code in common
(Capron, 1999). To avoid cross-cultural issues, we
also required that both the acquirer and the target be
United States– based. We selected acquisitions that
occurred between 1997 and 2001 because the construction of our performance measure required three
years of postacquisition financial data, and our survey methodology required that acquisitions occurred
in the recent past to ensure accurate responses. We
used Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC’s) Platinum
database to identify these acquisitions. An acquiring
firm also had to have stock price data available for the
38 months before and the 36 months after the focal
acquisition. Four hundred twenty-eight transactions
met these criteria. Telephone conversations indicated
that 51 acquirers had policies prohibiting survey responses, resulting in a final mailing sample of 377
transactions. Target assets ranged from $100 million
to $387 billion, with a mean of $5 billion. Acquirer
assets ranged from $106 million to $690 billion, with
a mean of $14 billion.
Survey design and administration. We developed the survey instrument by drawing on existing
literature and pretested the questionnaire with 22
experienced business executives. Survey administration followed Dillman’s tailored design method
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(2000). The first survey mailing, in May 2003, was
followed by two further mailings. We undertook considerable effort to identify the most appropriate executive involved in each focal acquisition’s integration
by contacting each acquirer. Although this methodology restricted us to using only one respondent per
acquisition, we identified the most knowledgeable
and appropriate person to complete the questionnaire, the principal methodological solution to problems posed by using single respondents (Campbell,
1955; John & Reeves, 1982). We sent multiple surveys
to a subset of the sample to provide a check on response bias. Two responses were received from 33
transactions; the interrater reliability tests are discussed in the preliminary analysis section below.
Survey response and representativeness. Responses corresponding to 137 acquisitions were
returned, constituting a respectable 36 percent
response rate (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson,
1993). Eight responses were eliminated because data
were missing; our final sample therefore contained
129 acquisitions. Table 1 presents survey respondent
characteristics. To ensure that respondents were representative of the population of 428 acquisitions, we
compared them to the population on two known acquisition characteristics: the value of the transaction
and the acquisition year. We also compared the
means of long-term stock performance, relative size,
and preacquisition return on equity (ROE). We did
not find any significant differences.
Measures
Measures were derived from a variety of sources:
primary data came from the survey questionnaire,
and secondary data were from the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP), Compustat,
SDC, and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database. We used multiple indicators wherever possible to permit tests of the reliability and validity of the measures. Appendix A
presents details of all measures.
Integration depth. We sought to understand the
extent of change in the structural relationships
between target and acquirer with this construct.
We therefore measured integration depth with 11
survey items about the extent to which different
areas or activities had been combined. We summarized these 11 items into four indicators.
Three items were averaged to measure employee
integration depth (␣ ⫽ .79); two items were averaged to measure production integration depth
(␣ ⫽ .67); three items were averaged to measure
marketing integration depth (␣ ⫽ .84); and three
items were averaged to measure systems integration depth (␣ ⫽ .86).

754

Academy of Management Journal

Integration speed. We measured integration
speed with the response to a survey question regarding the length of the integration process.
TMT turnover. We measured TMT turnover using
two indicators. Our interest was in measuring TMT
turnover after an initial postacquisition TMT was in
place. Unlike the authors of prior studies (e.g., Krishnan et al., 1997; Walsh, 1988), we did not consider
changes made immediately after an acquisition, permitting us to isolate the effects of TMT turnover during the integration. Our first indicator was a survey
response, and our second indicator was derived from
EDGAR. Following existing literature, we measured
changes in the top five executives (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Krishnan et al., 1997).
Market focus. We used survey data to measure this
construct and developed three questions to assess the
attention paid to customer needs during acquisition
integration. Our survey items were highly similar to
those used by Homburg and Bucerius (2005).
Intermediate goal achievement. We used survey data to measure internal reorganization and
market expansion goal achievement. Indicators for
each construct were weighted measures based on
each goal’s perceived importance at the time of an
acquisition and its level of achievement. Goal importance was measured by a survey question
adapted from Capron and Pistre (2002): “At the
time of the acquisition, how important were the
following objectives for the transaction?” Then,
four pages later in the questionnaire, respondents
addressed a question regarding the level of goal
achievement: “To what extent has your company
achieved the following objectives for the acquisition?” The same objectives followed both survey
questions. A seven-point Likert scale was used in
both cases. Following prior research (e.g., Covin,
Slevin, & Schultz, 1997; Parkhe, 1991), we rescaled
the goal achievement measure to a –3 to ⫹3 scale.
We then calculated importance-weighted goal
achievement indicators by multiplying the goal importance measure by the goal achievement measure
for each objective.
Internal reorganization goal achievement comprised two indicators: consolidation of similar
units, and knowledge transfer from acquirer to target. We used three indicators for market expansion
goal achievement: expansion into new customer
and/or geographic market segments, cross-selling,
and market share growth.5

5

We found that most firms in our sample viewed both
intermediate goals as important. The mean importance
score for our indicators of internal reorganization ranged
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TABLE 1
Sample Characteristics
Industry
Aerospace and aircraft
Air transportation and shipping
Amusement and recreation services
Business services
Chemicals and allied products
Commercial banks, bank holding companies
Communications equipment
Computer and office equipment
Drugs
Electric, gas, and water distribution
Electronic and electrical equipment
Food and kindred products
Holding companies, except banks
Hotels and casinos
Insurance
Investment and commodity firms, dealers
Machinery
Measuring, medical, photo equipment
Mining
Miscellaneous retail trade
Oil and gas; petroleum refining
Paper and allied products
Prepackaged software
Radio and TV broadcasting stations
Retail trade: food stores
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products
Sanitary services
Savings and loans, mutual savings banks
Telecommunications
Transportation equipment
Transportation and shipping (except air)
Wholesale trade—durable goods
Wholesale trade—nondurable goods
Total sample

4
2
2
10
3
34
1
2
3
14
3
1
1
2
5
8
1
1
2
1
7
1
3
1
1
1
1
6
2
2
2
1
1
129

Relative size (target vs. acquirer)
⬍25%
25–49%
50–74%
75–99%
⬎100%
Total sample

62
33
15
8
11
129

Year of acquisition
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Total sample

16
10
25
35
43
129

Respondents
Chair and vice chair
Chief executive officer
President
Chief financial officer
Chief operating officer
Chief administrative officer
Chief information officer
Executive vice president
Head of corporate development/M&A
Treasurer/controller
Senior vice president and vice president
Other
Total sample

8
9
11
15
3
3
1
5
27
7
26
14
129
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Acquisition performance. Because our interest
was the effect of integration on acquisition performance, we measured the performance of the sample acquisitions using the acquirers’ three-year
postacquisition abnormal stock returns. We did not
choose measures based on announcement effect
event studies, which are appropriate for studying
independent variables that are publicly known at
the time of an acquisition announcement but less
useful for variables revealed during integration
(Cording, Christmann, & Weigelt, 2006; Montgomery & Wilson, 1986; Zollo & Singh, 2004). We chose
stock performance rather than accounting-based
measures because of the numerous problems associated with those measures, such as the possible
manipulation of accounting returns (Chakravarthy,
1986) and possible differences in the accounting
policies employed by firms. In addition, postacquisition stock performance provides an indication of
market expectations of future value, but accounting
returns only reflect past realized performance
(Montgomery & Wilson, 1986). One drawback of
stock market measures (as well as accounting measures) is that firm-level factors unrelated to an acquisition may influence the performance measure
(Lubatkin, 1987). Nonetheless, researchers have
commonly used postacquisition stock performance
to operationalize acquisition performance (e.g.,
Anand & Singh, 1997; Farjoun, 1998; Hayward &
Hambrick, 1997; Lubatkin, 1987).
We selected a three-year time horizon for two
reasons. First, use of this length of time was consistent with existing guidance (Lubatkin, 1983) and
common practice in research on acquisition (e.g.,
Farjoun, 1998; Krishnan et al., 1997). Second, three
years is a sufficient length of time in which to
observe changes in firm postacquisition performance from a fully integrated acquisition (Lubatkin
et al., 2001).
We used two indicators of the acquirers’ threeyear postacquisition abnormal stock returns: monthly
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the period
beginning 1 month prior to an acquisition’s announcement date and ending 36 months later, and
Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 1968), also calculated for
the period beginning 1 month prior to the acquisition announcement date and ending 36 months
later. Appendix B presents details on the calculation of each indicator. All data came from CRSP,
and we used the CRSP equally weighted index as
the benchmark portfolio.

from 4.95 to 5.20, and from 4.50 to 5.35 for the indicators
of market expansion.
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Control variables. We included five control variables frequently used in acquisition research. The
first two variables (relative size and acquisition
experience) were viewed as potentially affecting all
three dependent variables (internal reorganization
goal achievement, market expansion goal achievement, and acquisition performance), and the remaining three variables (preacquisition return on
equity for acquirer and target, and subsequent acquisitions made by an acquirer) were only expected
to affect acquisition performance. First, the size of a
target relative to its acquirer (relative size) can affect the acquirer’s long-term stock performance as
well as intermediate goal achievement because integration is a more difficult task for larger acquisitions. We used two indicators to control for relative
size. Second, acquisition experience may improve
an acquirer’s integration skill (Hayward, 2002). We
used two indicators to control for acquisition experience. Next, we controlled for the preacquisition
profitability of both acquirer and target. Finally,
because we were using postacquisition abnormal
stock returns as our dependent variable, we controlled for possible confounding effects when an
acquirer engaged in subsequent acquisition activity
(Lubatkin, 1983).
Preliminary Data Analyses
Interrater reliability. We conducted analyses of
interrater reliability and agreement on the survey
data. We received a second survey response from
executives for 33 acquisitions and examined the
generalizability coefficient to determine how well
the average judgments from this subsample correlated with the average judgments from the universe
of potential judgments (Nunnally & Bernstein,
1994). The coefficient was .90, indicating a high
level of generalizability. We also calculated the coefficients rwg and rwg(j) to check within-group agreement, or the extent to which responses from different individuals were interchangeable (Bliese, 2000;
James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984, 1993). Average values for rwg and rwg(j) ranged from .76 to .82, suggesting high agreement (James et al., 1993). The analyses reported below thus used one randomly
selected survey response.
Common method bias considerations. Although
using key informants as a data source is common in
organizational research, it exposes the data to the
potential for common method bias. To reduce this
potential problem, we followed all recommendations made by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003) for questionnaire design (e.g., psychological separation of predictor and criterion
variables and response anonymity). We also con-
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ducted a statistical post hoc test of the influence of
common method bias, adding an unmeasured latent method factor to our model that permitted
“control for any systematic method variance among
the items that is independent of the covariance due
to the constructs of interest” (Podsakoff et al., 2003:
894). Items derived from the survey were loaded on
both their theoretical construct and the methods
factor. We found that all the significant relationships reported below held after controlling for the
methods factor, providing strong evidence that
common method bias was not driving our findings.
Analytical Technique
To fully estimate the paths in our model, we
conducted a partial least squares (PLS) analysis
using PLS-Graph, version 3.0 (Chin, 1998, 2001).
PLS is a powerful multivariate analysis technique
(see Fornell and Bookstein [1982] for a complete
description) and belongs to the family of techniques that also includes LISREL (Lohmoller,
1988). The primary goal of PLS, as opposed to
covariance-based structural equation modeling, is
to maximize the variance explained in latent and
endogenous variables. It is often referred to as variance-based structural equation modeling. When
compared to a two-stage multivariate estimation
technique, PLS permits multiple measures of both
dependent and independent variables, enabling the
assessment of indicator and construct reliability as
well as correction for measurement error (Bagozzi,
1994).
We believed that PLS was the appropriate analytic technique for our study for three reasons.
First, many of our variables had multiple indicators, and PLS weights indicator loadings on constructs in the context of the theoretical model
rather than in isolation (Hulland, 1999). Second,
covariance-based structural equation models require very large samples to achieve good estimates
of model parameters. Marsh, Hau, Balla and Grayson (1998) suggested a minimum sample size of
200. PLS is most appropriate for studies that have
relatively small samples or a large number of indicators per latent variable because power in the
analysis is maximized (Birkinshaw, Morrison, &
Hulland, 1995). Given our sample size (n ⫽ 129),
use of an analytical technique that maximized
power while permitting simultaneous estimation of
path coefficients (Hulland, 1999) seemed prudent.
Finally, PLS does not require assumptions about
multivariate normality (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982).
We conducted two analyses to determine whether
our intermediate goal achievement constructs (internal reorganization and market expansion) served as
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mediators in our model. If our intermediate goal
achievement variables fully mediated the relationships between integration decisions and acquisition
performance, we could conclude that intrafirm linkage ambiguity was reduced because the relationship
between decision and performance outcome was clarified. In the first test, we followed the procedure
recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) to test the
linkages in the mediating model. To establish mediation, three conditions must hold. First, the independent variable must affect the dependent variable; second, the independent variable must affect the
intervening variable; and third, the intervening variable must affect the dependent variable. Full mediation occurs if the independent variable has no significant effect on the dependent variable when the
intervening variable is controlled (Baron & Kenny,
1986). Our second analysis was Sobel’s (1982, 1988)
test. This test permitted us to determine whether the
intervening variables carried the effects of the independent variables on to the dependent variable.
Significant t-values would indicate that the intermediate goal achievement variables were important
mediators.

RESULTS
Reliability and Validity of Measures
We analyzed individual item reliability, internal
consistency, and discriminant validity to examine
the acceptability of our measurement model. Factor
loadings of measures onto their corresponding constructs were all greater than .70, indicating a high
degree of individual item reliability (Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994). Using the measure suggested by
Fornell and Larcker (1981), the typical statistic
used in PLS studies (Hulland, 1999), we found that
all composite reliability values exceeded the minimum threshold of .70 (Nunnally & Bernstein,
1994). Appendix A reports the individual item reliabilities and composite reliabilities. We conducted two statistical tests to ensure that our
constructs were acting independently. The first
discriminant validity test required that the construct share more variance with its items than it
shared with other constructs (Hulland, 1999). Table 2
presents the correlation matrix of all constructs and
single-item measures used in this study. The diagonal elements show the square root of the average
variance extracted for the corresponding construct.
Discriminant validity is established if this statistic
is greater than the correlations in the corresponding
columns and rows (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), a test
that our data met. We also employed Anderson and
Gerbing’s (1988) discriminant validity test on all
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TABLE 2
Correlation Matrixa
Construct
1. Acquisition performance
2. Market expansion intermediate goal
achievement
3. Internal reorganization
intermediate goal achievement
4. Integration depth
5. Integration speed
6. TMT turnover
7. Market focus
Control variables
8. Acquisition experience
9. Relative size
10. Acquirer ROE
11. Target ROE
12. Subsequent acquisitions
a

Number
of Items

1

2

3

4

5

6

2
3

.94
.40

.81

2

.11

.40

.82

4
1
1
3

.01
.20
⫺.14
.16

.30
.26
⫺.22
.45

2
2
1
1
1

⫺.12
⫺.15
⫺.05
⫺.27
⫺.16

⫺.06
⫺.16
.16
⫺.10
⫺.18

7

.31
.21
⫺.03
.35

.83
.03
⫺.06
.41

⫺.20
.13

⫺.11

.83

.01
⫺.07
.07
.04
⫺.15

.11
⫺.05
.15
⫺.06
⫺.03

.02
⫺.25
⫺.02
.05
⫺.24

⫺.01
.06
⫺.03
⫺.05
⫺.14

.14
⫺.16
.22
⫺.22
⫺.08

9

10

11

.91
⫺.29
.14
.19
.08

.94
⫺.28
⫺.05
.20

.01
⫺.07

.14

For multiple-item constructs, figures on the diagonal represent the square root of the average variance extracted. n ⫽ 129.

pairs of constructs whose correlation was greater
than .30. We found that each pair of constructs was
not perfectly correlated, providing further evidence
that discriminant validity was achieved (Bagozzi &
Phillips, 1982).

Tests of Hypotheses
Figure 2 presents the path coefficients for the
PLS model. These statistics are standardized regression coefficients and are interpreted in a man-

FIGURE 2
Structural Model Resultsa

Standardized parameter estimates are shown; control variables not shown are insignificant. n ⫽ 129.
†
p ⬍ .10
* p ⬍ .05
** p ⬍ .01
*** p ⬍ .001
a

8
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ner similar to regression analysis coefficients. Also
reported are squared multiple correlation coefficients (R2 statistics) for all endogenous constructs.
In contrast to other covariance structure analysis
modeling approaches, a PLS analysis has the primary objective of minimizing error. Therefore,
there are no overall goodness-of-fit statistics for a
PLS model. The model is evaluated on the basis of
strong indicator loadings, R2 values, and significance of the structural paths (Chin, 1998).
Our first set of hypotheses links certain integration variables with internal reorganization goal
achievement. Hypothesis 1, arguing that the greater
the integration depth, the greater the internal reorganization goal achievement, is strongly supported
(␤ ⫽ .33, p ⬍ .001). Hypothesis 2 is also supported:
the faster the integration, the greater the internal
reorganization goal achievement (␤ ⫽ .20, p ⬍ .05).
These variables explain 14 percent of the variance
in the internal reorganization goal achievement
construct.
Our next set of hypotheses explores antecedents
to market expansion goal achievement. Hypothesis
3 is supported: TMT turnover is negatively and
significantly related to market expansion goal
achievement (␤ ⫽ ⫺.17, p ⬍ .05). We also found
that market focus during integration is positively
and significantly related to market expansion goal
achievement, supporting Hypothesis 4 (␤ ⫽ .33,
p ⬍ .001). As predicted by Hypothesis 5, internal
reorganization goal achievement is positively and
significantly related to market expansion goal
achievement (␤ ⫽ .29, p ⬍ .001). Also marginally
influencing market expansion goal achievement are
the control variables acquisition experience (␤ ⫽
⫺.13, p ⬍ .10) and relative size (␤ ⫽ ⫺.11, p ⬍ .10).
These variables explain 32 percent of the variance
in market expansion goal achievement.
We find strong support for our last hypothesis
(Hypothesis 6). Market expansion goal achievement is strongly related to acquisition performance
(␤ ⫽ .38, p ⬍ .001). Also influencing acquisition
performance is the control variable target premerger ROE (␤ ⫽ ⫺.22, p ⬍ .01), a result consistent
with prior research (e.g., Capron & Pistre, 2002). All
other control variables are nonsignificant. Our
model explains fully 25 percent of the variance in
acquisition performance.
Tests of Mediation
Given our hypothesis-testing results, we explored mediation along five paths in our model:
(1) integration depth to market expansion goal
achievement, (2) integration speed to market expansion goal achievement, (3) TMT turnover to ac-
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quisition performance, (4) market focus to acquisition performance, and (5) internal reorganization
goal achievement to acquisition performance. Table 3 presents a summary of the results. Baron and
Kenny’s (1986) first condition for mediation requires that the independent and dependent variables in an analysis be significantly related. As can
be seen in the “Direct Effect Model” column of
Table 3, all of our paths except one meet this test.6
The hypothesis-testing results reported above provide support for Baron and Kenny’s (1986) second
and third conditions. The strength of mediation is
determined by the significance of a path added to a
mediated model from the independent variable to
the dependent variable. Here all paths were insignificant, suggesting that the intervening variables
fully mediate the relationships (see the column
labeled “Full Mediation” in Table 3). We also
conducted Sobel’s (1982, 1988) test to examine
whether the intervening variable carried the effects
of the independent variables on to the dependent
variable. A significant t-value indicates that the
intervening variable is an important mediator, a
test our data met, as reported in the last column of
Table 3. Hence, we concluded that the two intermediate goal achievement variables fully mediate
the relationships between our four integration variables and acquisition performance.
The role of intermediate goals in reducing intrafirm
linkage ambiguity can be demonstrated by considering our mediation results for the path from market
focus to acquisition performance. The “Direct Effects” column in Table 3 reports that the direct path
between market focus and acquisition performance is
significant (p ⬍ .05). The significance of this path,
however, disappears when the mediating variable of
market expansion goal achievement is included in
the model (see the “Full Mediation” column in Table
3). These mediation test results support our theoretical argument that an understanding of the role played
by intermediate goals reduces intrafirm linkage
ambiguity.
DISCUSSION
We argued that the process of integrating acquisitions is characterized by high levels of intrafirm

6

As we expected, we do not find a statistically significant direct effect of internal reorganization goal achievement on acquisition performance (␤ ⫽ .09; t ⫽ 1.33). This
is consistent with Barney’s (1988) argument suggesting
that cost savings will likely be bid away in the negotiation process, leaving the acquirer with at best normal
returns.
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TABLE 3
Results of Tests of Mediationa
Path (a 3 b 3 c)
Depth 3 internal reorganization 3 market expansion
Speed 3 internal reorganization 3 market expansion
TMT turnover 3 market expansion 3 acquisition
performance
Market focus 3 market expansion 3 acquisition
performance
Internal reorganization 3 market expansion 3 acquisition
performance
a

Direct Effect Model
(a 3 c)

Full
Mediation

Sobel
t-Test

p ⬍ .001
p ⬍ .01
p ⬍ .10

Yes
Yes
Yes

p ⬍ .01
p ⬍ .10
p ⬍ .05

p ⬍ .05

Yes

p ⬍ .001

p ⬎ .10

n.a.

n.a.

n ⫽ 129.

linkage ambiguity and that this ambiguity contributes to difficulties encountered during integration
and lowers acquisition performance. We suggested
that the identification of intermediate goals that are
sequential steps between integration decisions and
acquisition performance can reduce intrafirm linkage ambiguity. We developed and tested a structural model in which the achievement of intermediate goals serves an important mediating function.
Our results strongly support the mediating role of
intermediate goal achievement; the significance
of all direct relationships between integration
decisions and acquisition performance disappears
when intermediate goal achievement is included in
the model. These results indicate that the intermediate goals identified in our study reduce intrafirm
linkage ambiguity because they break down the
complex causal chain between integration decisions and acquisition performance into more
manageable segments.
Our study contributes to both the resource-basedview and acquisition literatures. With respect to
the resource-based view, we make two primary
contributions. First, we identify and test a mechanism to reduce intrafirm linkage ambiguity. Although the detrimental effect of intrafirm linkage
ambiguity on firm performance has been documented (e.g., King & Zeithaml, 2001), research on
reducing causal ambiguity has so far been limited
to conceptual development dealing with characteristic ambiguity (Zollo & Winter, 2002). Our study
focuses on how intermediate goals improve understanding of the links between integration decisions
and acquisition performance, thereby reducing intrafirm linkage ambiguity in the integration process. Moreover, our empirical results suggest that
this reduction in intrafirm linkage ambiguity is related to improved acquisition performance when
those intermediate goals are achieved.
Our finding that intermediate goal achievement
fully mediates the relationships between integra-

tion decisions and acquisition performance has important implications for empirical research. In
studies of the effects of complex organizational processes, researchers should use constructs that are
sequentially closer to their explanatory variables
rather than a more distant performance measure as
the dependent variable. This use of mediating variables is consistent with Ray, Barney, and Muhanna’s (2004) suggestion that overall firm performance is not an appropriate variable for tests of the
resource-based view, but that the effectiveness of
business processes may be a more appropriate dependent variable.
Second, we applied the resource-based view to
strategy implementation, an area that has received
little attention in the empirical resource-based literature. Only a few studies in this research stream
have examined how possession of resources affects
implementation of strategies. For example, Christmann (2000) found that the possession of complementary resources facilitates the implementation of
certain management practices. Although most research has focused on the characteristics of resources necessary for a sustainable competitive
advantage, Sirmon et al. (2007) called for an increased focus on how to manage those resources
to extract the maximum value possible. Our
study is an initial attempt to answer this call. By
explicating the chain of events through which
integration decisions influence performance outcomes, we have made a step toward a better understanding of how acquirers may exploit existing resources. Our finding that intermediate goals
can reduce intrafirm linkage ambiguity can likely
be applied to strategy implementation in other
complex organizational events or processes that
are characterized by simultaneous interdependent decisions, such as strategic alliances or newproduct development processes.
A contribution of our model to acquisition research is differentiating the effects of individual
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integration decisions on different intermediate
acquisition goals. In our importance-weighted intermediate goal achievement measure, we took
into account the fact that acquisitions differ in
their value-creating mechanisms. Indeed, different integration decisions lead to the achievement
of different intermediate goals, suggesting that
the relationship between a given integration decision and acquisition performance should be
considered in light of the acquisition’s intermediate goals. We also showed that integration decisions are related to acquisition performance by
operating through intervening variables, providing a meaningful clarification of the theoretical
framework linking integration decisions and acquisition performance.
A final contribution comes from our structural
model incorporating the notion that acquirers pursue
multiple intermediate goals and that these intermediate goals are related. Over 68 percent of the respondents viewed both internal reorganization and market
expansion as important goals for the transaction, a
finding that is consistent with Walter and Barney’s
(1990) conclusion that several different managerial
goals are simultaneously pursued in horizontal acquisitions. Although acquirers generally pursue increased financial returns, one can picture financial
performance as resting on a hierarchy of intermediate
goals. For instance, we show that an acquirer should
both internally reorganize and expand its market
reach to achieve positive acquisition performance.
We have argued theoretically that internal reorganization should precede market expansion, but the nature of our data does not permit us to make this
empirical conclusion. We believe that our arguments
are logically consistent, but additional research is
required.
An interesting result of our study is the lack of a
significant relationship between internal reorganization goal achievement and acquisition performance.
The correlation between these two constructs is only
.11 (see Table 2), suggesting a relatively weak relationship. Our findings are consistent with Barney’s
(1988) theoretical argument that cost savings are
likely available to multiple bidders and that the gains
will therefore be appropriated by shareholders of the
target rather than the acquirer. This is an important
conclusion because extant acquisition research typically does not differentiate between different sources
of gains. As a result, the conventional wisdom that
acquisitions do not produce positive abnormal returns may be questionable. Perhaps a more accurate
statement would be that acquisitions based on cost
reductions are less likely to produce positive abnormal returns than those whose strategic logic involves
market expansion.
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Our study also has implications for managers. We
highlight the importance of managing to the achievement of intermediate goals along the path to higher
acquisition performance. This emphasis contrasts
with prescriptions made in the existing literature. For
example, managers are often criticized for not having
a “blueprint for implementation” when acquisitions
are consummated (Feldman & Spratt, 1987: 411).
However, a sequential approach using intermediate
goals to guide management decisions and reduce intrafirm linkage ambiguity suggests that these blueprints should be flexible. Using intermediate
goals to guide their integration decisions allows
managers to advance their causal understanding,
improve their decision making, and ultimately
enhance acquisition performance.
Our study is not without limitations. Some arise
from the availability of data, and others relate to restrictions in the scope of our research. First, the nature of our data restricts any definitive conclusions
about the direction of causality. Although our theory
suggests that acquirers will first internally reorganize
and then look to expand their market presence, and
we found a significant and positive relationship between these two constructs, we cannot conclude causation. Future researchers may wish to conduct longitudinal studies to investigate precisely what actions
lead to what outcomes. Second, there may be variation in our finding of an insignificant relationship
between internal reorganization goal achievement
and acquisition performance by industry or strategic
orientation, and those conducting future research
may wish to explore this in more depth. Finally, we
cannot be sure that all acquisitions had equal potential for value creation (Larsson et al., 2004). Therefore,
our findings may reflect variance in value creation
potential in addition to variance in the effectiveness
of integration.
Researchers may wish to explore other integration decisions that may be related to intermediate
goal achievement. Integration depth and speed explained only 14 percent of the variance in our internal reorganization goal achievement construct.
Additional variables capturing such internal integration issues as changes in employee productivity
may provide improved explanatory power. We also
do not suggest that intermediate goal achievement
is the only intervening variable of any import or
that internal reorganization and market expansion
are the only important intermediate goals; future
research should consider others. Additional research should also examine other types of acquisitions. For example, our finding that integration
speed is positively associated with internal reorganization goal achievement may not extend to acquisitions focused specifically on knowledge trans-
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fer (Ranft & Lord, 2002) or to unrelated acquisitions
(Homburg & Bucerius, 2006).
In closing, our findings shed light on a complexchain of events. We find strong support for mediation
of the relationship between integration decisions and
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acquisition performance by internal reorganization
and market expansion goal achievement. We thereby
provide an important theoretical clarification of the
relationship between integration decisions and acquisition performance.

APPENDIX A
Construct Measurement
TABLE A1
Constructs, Indicators, and Reliabilities

Construct
Integration depth
Source: Survey

Integration speed
Source: Survey

TMT turnover
Source: Survey

Indicator

Please indicate the degree to which the following items or areas were
integrated or combined as a result of the acquisition (1, “not at
all”; 7, “completely”)
Employee integration: The average of (a) organizational structure,
(b) organizational culture, and (c) personnel (HR) management
practices.
Production integration: The average of (a) production and (b)
supply sources.
Marketing integration: The average of (a) distribution channels, (b)
sales/after-sales service, and (c) marketing programs.
Systems integration: The average of (a) strategic planning systems,
(b) financial and budget systems, and (c) management
information systems.

Individual
Item
Reliability

Composite
Reliability

.90

.78

.86
.83
.84

Approximately how long did the integration process take? (1 ⫽ more
than 24 months; 2 ⫽ 19–24 months; 3 ⫽ 13–18 months; 4 ⫽ 7–
12 months; 5 ⫽ 6 months or less)

Of the initial postacquisition executive team, how many of the top
five executives have since left the firm? (0–5)

.91
.89

Source: SEC’s
EDGAR
database

Count of the number of top five executives listed in acquirer’s annual
proxy statement as of the fiscal year immediately following the
effective date of the acquisition who were not listed three years
later.

.93

Did the company’s commitment to serving customers increase or
decrease after the acquisition relative to before the acquisition?
(1, “decreased greatly”; 7, “increased greatly”)

.73

Market focus

Please indicate below the extent to which the following principles or
objectives guided decisions during the integration phase of the
acquisition (1, “not at all”; 7, “to a very large extent”)
Decisions were made based on what was best for the customer.
Integration decisions sought to improve the value delivered to
customers.
Intermediate goal achievement
Source: Survey
Both intermediate goal achievement constructs are comprised of
multiple indicators, each calculated by multiplying the goal
achievement score by the goal importance score.

.85
.91

.87
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1
Continued

Construct

Indicator

Individual
Item
Reliability

Composite
Reliability

Goal achievement score: To what extent has your company
achieved the following objectives for the acquisition? (⫺3,
“not at all”; ⫹3, “above target”)
Goal importance score: At the time of the acquisition, how
important were the following objectives for this transaction?
(1, “not important”; 7, “extremely important)
Internal reorganization goals
Consolidation of similar units
Transfer of knowledge from the acquirer to the target
Market expansion goals
Expansion into new customer and/or geographic market
segments
Market share growth
Cross-selling (i.e., sale of acquirer products to the target’s
customers and vice versa)
Acquisition performance
Source: CRSP

Relative size
Source: Compustat

Acquisition experience
Source: Survey

Source: SDC

.86
.79
.85
.86
.81
.76

Two indicators:
36-month cumulative abnormal returns
36-month Jensen’s alpha

.94
.95

Two indicators (measured in fiscal year prior to acquisition):
Ratio of target assets to acquirer assets
Ratio of target sales to acquirer sales

.96
.91

Over the five years preceding this acquisition, approximately
how many acquisitions did the acquirer complete?
(1 ⫽ none; 2 ⫽ 1–2; 3 ⫽ 3–4; 4 ⫽ 5–6; 5 ⫽ 7 or more)
Count of acquisitions completed during the five years preceding
the focal acquisition

Acquirer pre-M&A profitability
Source: Compustat
Industry-adjusted average ROE for 3 years prior to acquisition
(Industry adjustment is the median return earned by all
firms sharing the same 3-digit primary SIC code.)
Target pre-M&A profitability
Source: Compustat
Industry-adjusted average ROE for 3 years prior to acquisition
(Industry adjustment is same as in previous measure.)
Subsequent acquisitions
Source: SDC

.81

Count of acquisitions made by the acquirer during the three
years after the focal acquisition

.95

.94

.91
.93
.90
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APPENDIX B
Description of Long-Term Stock
Performance Measures
Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Calculation is based on the market model for the period beginning one month prior to the announcement
date of an acquisition and ending 36 months after the
acquisition announcement date. The estimation period is
the 36 months ending two months prior to the announcement date; the CRSP equally weighted market index was
used for a benchmark portfolio. The market model first
estimates ␣j and ␤j from returns earned during the estimation period:
R jt ⫽ ␣ j ⫹ ␤ j R mt ⫹ ⑀ jt ,
where Rjt is the rate of return on the common stock of the
j[th] firm in month t, Rmt is the rate of return of a market
index in month t, and ⑀jt is the random error term. ␤j is a
parameter that measures the sensitivity of Rjt to the market index. The abnormal return for firm j for month t is
defined as:
AR jt ⫽ R jt ⫺ ( ␣ j ⫹ ␤ j R mt ),
where t now corresponds to the event window. The variable used in our models— cumulative abnormal returns—is the sum of the abnormal returns for the 37month event window.
Jensen’s Alpha
Calculation is based on regression of stock price for a
37-month period beginning the month before an acquisition announcement date and using the CRSP equally
weighted market index. The excess return in this calculation is the intercept, and both ␣ and ␤ are estimated
during the event window. Jensen’s alpha is defined as:
R jt ⫽ ␣ j ⫹ ␤ j R mt ⫹ ⑀ jt ,
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